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Abstract
This paper studies the implications of cross-country housing-market heterogeneity in a monetary
union for both shock transmission and welfare. I develop a two-country new Keynesian general
equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints to explore this issue. The conventional
wisdom is that welfare would be higher in a monetary union if mortgage markets were homogeneous.
This paper shows instead that welfare is higher only when homogenization does not result in higher
aggregate volatility (because of nancial accelerator e¤ects) or does not redistribute too much wealth
from borrowers to savers.
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"Several of the benets of the euro are already clearly visible, such as the deepening of trade and
nancial links between euro area countries and the greater resilience of the euro area to external shocks.
Today I will discuss both of these accomplishments, and I will also touch on some of the challenges that
we continue to face. For instance, there is presently a degree of diversity among euro area countries".
Jean-Claude Trichet, October 8, 2007.
1 Introduction
Costs and benets of monetary unions are a much-discussed topic, especially in relation to Europes
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). There are clear arguments in favor of such unions. A single
currency eliminates exchange rate risk, allows rapid price comparison, lowers transaction costs across
countries and favors trade. However, costs can arise if countries are not su¢ ciently similar in some
respects. Di¤erent national characteristics such as heterogeneous institutions, consumption patterns or
nancial structures can be a source of di¤erent transmission of common shocks. Also, country-specic
shocks derived from member heterogeneity can enhance the possible divergence.
In this paper, I focus on housing markets. I develop a two-country new Keynesian general equilibrium
model with housing and collateral constraints and I consider how heterogeneous housing markets across
members in a currency area a¤ect the transmission of shocks. Then, I compare the dynamics with existing
empirical studies and use the model to evaluate from a normative perspective whether housing-market
homogenization would be benecial.
Countries in Europe clearly di¤er in their housing markets. There is evidence of di¤erent loan-
to-value ratios (LTVs), di¤erent proportions of residential debt relative to GDP across countries, and
heterogeneous mortgage contracts. Also, house-price movements do not follow the same pattern in every
country. The conventional wisdom is that welfare would be higher in a monetary union if mortgage
markets were homogeneous. For instance, Maclennan et al. (1998) concluded that an e¤ort should be
made toward institutional homogenization among European countries to alleviate possible tensions. In
its study "Housing Finance in the Euro Area," the European Central Bank (ECB 2009) also remarks on
the importance of such di¤erences for the EMU.
Table 1 in the Appendix shows that countries in Europe have di¤erent LTVs, as well as di¤erent
residential-debt-to-GDP ratios. LTVs are as low as 50% in Italy and as high as 90% in the Netherlands,
where the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 100%. In countries with a high LTV or a high proportion of
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indebted consumers, housing collateral e¤ects are stronger. Therefore, shocks that a¤ect the value of
the collateral constraint could potentially have amplied e¤ects on aggregate variables. This is a clear
example of the nancial accelerator mechanism, rst modeled by Bernanke et al (1999).
Di¤erences in mortgage contracts across countries are another important source of heterogeneity in
Europe. In countries such as Germany or France, the majority of mortgages are xed rate. Conversely,
the predominant type of mortgages in such countries as the United Kingdom, Spain, and Greece is
variable rate. Calza et al (2009) and Rubio (2011) showed that the mortgage structure of an economy
is an important factor in the transmission of shocks.
Extensive studies discuss the di¤erences in the transmission mechanisms between European countries
using vector autoregressive (VARs) or large macroeconometric models, but few have focused on the
consequences of housing-market heterogeneity from a theoretical standpoint.1 A microfounded general
equilibrium model is needed to understand the implications of housing-market di¤erences, explore all the
interrelations that take place in the economy, and conduct some normative analysis. Closed-economy
models do not take into account important interactions, such as the fact that countries trade in both
consumption goods and nancial assets. A two-country model is also needed to appropriately calibrate
the economy, according the corresponding size to each country and thereby comparing the result of the
analysis with the evidence.
This paper relates to di¤erent strands of the literature. On the one hand, it is related to papers
that study the shock transmission under di¤erent housing-market characteristics, such as the work by
Calza et al (2009). I extend their framework to an international version to address those issues in a
monetary union. My paper is also related to two-country models with a nancial accelerator, such as
that of Gilchrist et al (2002). In contrast to their model, which does not feature a housing market, those
by Iacoviello and Smets (2006) and Aspachs and Rabanal (2008) develop a monetary-union model with
housing markets and collateral constraints.2 I add to this literature by considering the role of mortgage-
contract heterogeneity and provide normative analysis.3 The present paper also has links with papers
that study welfare for di¤erent housing-market features. For instance, Campbell and Hercowitz (2009)
study the welfare implications of moving to high LTVs. Rubio (2011) analyzes welfare when mortgages
can be xed or variable rate. I also consider these issues, but extend the analysis to a two-country
1For empirical VAR studies, see Calza et al (2009), Carstensen et al (2009) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010).
2Aspachs and Rabanal (2008) focus on the case of Spain and the EMU.
3Darracq and Notarpietro (2008) study optimal monetary policy in a two-country model with housing for the US and
the EMU.
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setting.
This paper presents a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model within a
monetary union that features a housing market. In each country, there is a group of individuals that
are credit constrained and need housing collateral to obtain loans. Countries trade goods, and savers in
each country have access to foreign assets. Across countries, I allow for di¤erences in LTVs and in the
structure of mortgage contracts (xed versus variable rate).
In line with empirical studies, my results show that in a monetary union common shocks have a
di¤erent impact across countries when there is housing-market heterogeneity. In particular, consumption
reacts more strongly after a shock when the LTV is high or when mortgages are predominantly variable
rate. Since the dynamics of the model seemed plausible, I used it to carry out welfare analysis. From
a normative perspective, I found that housing-market homogeneity per se is not necessarily benecial.
Welfare is higher only when homogenization does not result in higher aggregate volatility or does not
redistribute too much wealth from borrowers to savers. For example, total welfare is higher in a situation
where LTVs are asymmetrical than when they are equal but very high; this is, in line with the ndings
of Campbell and Hercowitz (2009). Also, for mortgage contracts, homogenization is welfare improving
only if it is toward xed-rate mortgages. These results have clear policy implications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents the model
dynamics. Section 4 analyzes welfare. Section 5 is the conclusion. Tables, steady-state relationships,
and the linearized model are shown in the Appendix.
2 Model Setup
I consider an innite-horizon, two-country economy inside a monetary union. The home country is
denoted by A and the rest of the union by B. Households consume, work, and demand real estate.
There is a nancial intermediary in each country that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from
consumers. Each country produces one di¤erentiated intermediate good, but households consume goods
from both countries. For simplicity, housing is a non-traded good. I assume that labor is immobile across
the countries. Firms follow a standard Calvo problem. In this economy, both nal and intermediate
goods are produced. Prices are sticky in the intermediate-goods sector. Monetary policy is conducted
by a single central bank that responds to a weighted average of ination in both countries. I allow for
housing-market heterogeneity across the countries.
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2.1 The Consumers Problem
There are three types of consumers in each country: unconstrained consumers, constrained consumers
who borrow at a variable rate, and constrained consumers who borrow at a xed rate. The proportion
of each type of borrower is xed and exogenous.4 Consumers can be constrained or unconstrained in the
sense that constrained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from
the nancial intermediary. Interest payments in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the future
value of the current house stock. In this way, the nancial intermediary ensures that borrowers are going
to be able to fulll their debt obligations in the next period. As in Iacoviello (2005), I assume that
constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones.5 There is a nancial intermediary
in each country. The nancial intermediary in Country A accepts deposits from domestic savers, and it
extends both xed- and variable-rate loans to domestic borrowers.
2.1.1 The Financial Intermediary
I assume a competitive framework, and thus the intermediary takes the variable interest rate as given.6
The prots of the nancial intermediary are dened as:7
Ft = ARAt 1bcvt 1 + (1  A)RAt 1bcft 1  RAt 1but 1: (1)
In equilibrium, aggregate borrowing and saving must be equal, that is,
Ab
cv
t + (1  A) bcft = but : (2)
Substituting (2) into (1), we obtain,
Ft = (1  A) bcft 1
 
RAt 1  RAt 1

: (3)
For the two types of mortgage to be o¤ered, the xed-interest rate has to be such that the intermediary
4According to the European Mortgage Federation, the type of mortgage contracts across countries responds to a large
extent to institutional or cultural factors, which are out of the scope of the present model. In the short run, the proportion
of each type of mortgage contract can uctuate, but typically it does not imply a change in the xed- or variable-rate
category of the country.
5This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state and that the economy is endoge-
nously split into borrowers and savers.
6See Andrés and Arce (2008) for a housing model with collateral constraints in which banks are imperfectly competitive
and are able to set optimal lending rates.
7The superscript cv signies "constrained variable," cf "constrained xed".
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is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or xed rate. Hence, the expected discounted prots that the
intermediary obtains by lending new debt in a given period at a xed-interest rate must be equal to the
expected discounted prots the intermediary would obtain by lending it at a variable rate:
E
1X
i=+1
i ;iRA
OPT
 = E
1X
i=+1
i ;iRAi 1; (4)
where t;i =
CuAt
CuAt+i
is the unconstrained-consumer relevant discount factor. Since the nancial interme-
diary is owned by the savers, their stochastic discount factor is applied to the nancial intermediarys
problem. Notice that, as stated before, variable-rate debt is in one period, but the portion of new debt
acquired at a xed rate is associated with a long-term contract. Since the agent is innitely lived, I
assume here that the maturity of xed-rate mortgages is also innity.
We can obtain the equilibrium value of the xed rate in period  from expression (4) :
R
OPT
A =
E
1P
i=+1
i ;iRAi 1
E
1P
i=+1
i ;i
: (5)
Equation (5) states that for every new debt issued at date  , there is a di¤erent xed-interest rate
that has to be equal to a discounted average of future variable-interest rates. Notice that this is not a
condition on the stock of debt, but on the new amount obtained in a given period. New debt at a given
point in time is associated with a di¤erent xed-interest rate. Both the xed-interest rate in period 
and the new amount of debt in period  are xed for all future periods. However, the xed-interest
rate varies with the date the debt was issued, so that in every period there is a new xed-interest rate
associated with new debt in this period. If we consider xed-rate loans to be long term, the nancial
intermediary obtains interest payments every period from the whole stock of debt, not only from the
new ones. Hence, we can dene an aggregate xed-interest rate as the one the nancial intermediary
e¤ectively charges every period for the whole stock of mortgages. This aggregate xed-interest rate is
composed of all past xed-interest rates and past debt, together with the current-period equilibrium
xed-interest rate and new amount of debt. Therefore, the e¤ective xed-interest rate that the nancial
intermediary charges for the stock of xed-rate debt every period is as follows:
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RAt =
8><>:
RAt 1b
cf
t 1+R
OPT
At

bcft  bcft 1

bcft
if bcft > b
cf
t 1
RAt 1 if b
cf
t  bcft 1
9>=>; : (6)
Equation (6) states that the xed-interest rate that the nancial intermediary charges today is an average
of what it charged the previous period for the previous stock of mortgages and what it charges in the
current period for the new amount. If there is no new debt, the xed-interest rate will be equal to that
of the previous period. Then, in the same way that variable rates are revised every period, xed-rates
are revised by including the new optimal xed-interest rate for the new debt originating in this period.
Importantly, this assumption is not crucial for results. Both R
OPT
A and RAt are practically una¤ected
by interest rate shocks.8 This assumption is a way to make the model compatible with the fact that
xed-rate loans are not one-period assets but longer-term ones.
As noted above any prots from nancial intermediation are rebated to the unconstrained consumers
every period. Even if the nancial intermediary is competitive and does not make prots in the absence
of shocks, should a shock occur, the fact that only the variable-interest rate is directly a¤ected can
generate non-zero prots.
The nancial intermediary problem for Country B is symmetrical.
2.1.2 Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers in Country A maximize as follows:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + jt lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



; (7)
Here, E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and Cut , Hut , and Lut are consump-
tion at t, the stock of housing, and hours worked, respectively.9 jt represents the weight of housing in
the utility function. I assume that log (jt) = log(j)+uJt, where uJt follows an autoregressive process. A
shock to jt represents a shock to the marginal utility of housing. These shocks directly a¤ect housing de-
mand and therefore can be interpreted as a proxy for exogenous disturbances to house prices. 1= (   1)
is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption is a bundle of domestically and foreign-produced goods, dened as: Cut = (C
u
At)
n (CuBt)
1 n ;
8 In log-linearized terms, the new xed interest rate is always equal to the past xed interest rate, therefore, equation
(6) does not introduce a kink.
9 It is assumed that housing services are proportional to the housing stock.
7
where n is the size of Country A.
The budget constraint for Country A is as follows:
PAtC
u
At + PBtC
u
Bt +QtH
u
t +RAt 1B
u
t 1 +Rt 1Dt 1 +
 
2
D2t  QtHut 1+
W ut L
u
t +B
u
t +Dt + PAtFt + PAtSt; (8)
where PAt and PBt are the prices of the goods produced in Countries A and B, respectively, Qt is the
housing price in Country A, and W ut is the wage for unconstrained consumers. B
u
t represents domestic
bonds denominated in the common currency. RAt is the nominal interest rate in Country A. Positive
bond holdings signify borrowing, and negative signify savings. However, as we will see, this group will
choose not to borrow at all: they are the savers in this economy. Dt are foreign-bond holdings by
savers in Country A.10 Rt is the nominal rate of foreign bonds, which are denominated in euros. As is
common in the literature, to ensure stationarity of net foreign assets I introduced a small quadratic cost
of deviating from zero foreign borrowing,  2D
2
t .
11 Savers obtain interest on their savings. St and Ft are
lump-sum prots received from the rms and the nancial intermediary in Country A, respectively.
Dividing by PAt, we can rewrite the budget constraint in terms of goods A:
CuAt +
PBt
PAt
CuBt + qtH
u
t +
RAt 1but 1
At
+
Rt 1dt 1
PAt
+
 
2
d2t  qtHut 1 + wut Lut + but + dt + Ft + St; (9)
where At denotes ination for the goods produced in Country A, dened as PAt=PAt 1:
Maximizing (7) subject to (9) ; we obtain the rst-order conditions for the unconstrained group:
CuAt
CuBt
=
nPBt
(1  n)PAt (10)
1
CuAt
= Et

RAt
At+1CuAt+1

; (11)
1   dt
CuAt
= Et

Rt
At+1CuAt+1

; (12)
10Savers have access to international nancial markets.
11See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) for a similar specication of the budget constraint.
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wut = (L
u
t )
 1 CuAt
n
; (13)
jt
Hut
=
n
CuAt
qt   Et n
CuAt+1
qt+1: (14)
Equation (10) equates the marginal rate of substitution between goods to the relative price. Equation
(11) is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (12) is the rst-order condition for net foreign
assets. Equation (13) is the labor-supply condition. These equations are standard. Equation (14) is the
Euler equation for housing and states that at the margin the benets from consuming housing have to
be equal to the costs.
Combining (11) and (12) we obtain a non-arbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds:12
RAt =
Rt
(1   dt) : (15)
Since all consumption goods are traded and there are no barriers to trade, I assume in this paper
that the law of one price holds:
PAt = P

At; (16)
where variables with a star denote foreign variables.
2.1.3 Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
Constrained consumers in Country A are of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and those
who do so at a xed rate. The di¤erence between them is the interest rate they are charged. The
variable-rate constrained consumer faces RAt, which will coincide with the rate set by the central bank.
The xed-rate borrower pays RAt, derived from the nancial intermediarys problem. The proportion
of variable-rate consumers in Country A is constant and exogenous and is equal to A 2 [0; 1].
Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, that is e < . Constrained
consumers face a collateral constraint: the expected debt repayment in the next period cannot exceed a
proportion of the expectation of tomorrows value of todays stock of housing:
12The log-linearized version of this equation could be interpreted as the uncovered interest-rate parity.
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Et
RAt
At+1
bcvt  kAEtqt+1Hcvt ; (17)
Et
RAt
At+1
bcft  kAEtqt+1Hcft ; (18)
where equations (17) and (18) represent the collateral constraint for the variable- and xed-rate borrower,
respectively. kA can be interpreted as the loan-to-value ratio in Country A. Notice that such models
with collateral constraints, the LTV is typically considered exogenous. In reality, the LTV can be a
decision variable of the bank, depending on the characteristics of the borrowers. However, this is a
macroeconomic model, in which borrowers are a representative agent within their type and therefore
the LTV is considered an exogenous parameter.13As I pointed out when I introduced the problem of
the nancial intermediary, RAt is an aggregate interest rate that contains information on all the past
xed-interest rates associated with past debt. Each period, this aggregate interest rate is updated with
a new interest rate linked to the new amount of debt originating in that period.
Without loss of generality, I present the problem for the variable-rate borrower since that for the
xed rate is symmetrical. Variable-rate borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
max E0
1X
t=0
etlnCcvt + jt lnHcvt   (Lcvt )

; (19)
where Ccvt = (C
cv
At)
n (CcvBt)
1 n ; subject to the budget constraint (in terms of good A):
CcvAt +
PBt
PAt
CcvBt + qtH
cv
t +
RAt 1bcvt 1
At
 qtHcvt 1 + wcvt Lcvt + bcvt ; (20)
and subject to the collateral constraint (17). Notice that variable-rate borrowers repay all debt every
period and acquire new debt at the current new interest rate. This assumption implies that the interest
rate on variable-rate mortgages is revised every period for the whole stock of debt and changed according
to the policy rate.14 To make the problem for xed-rate borrowers symmetrical and analogous to existing
models with borrowing constraints, I assume the same debt-repayment structure for this type of borrower.
13At the macroeconomic level, LTVs partly depend on exogenous factors such as regulation. This parameter is usually
calibrated to match the average LTV in the country analyzed.
14This assumption is consistent with reality, in which variable-interest rates are revised very frequently and changed
according to an interest-rate index tied to the interest rate set by the central bank.
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Obviously, xed-rate contracts are not revised every period. However, to make the model more realistic,
but still tractable, the xed-interest rate will be such that a revised xed rate will be applied only on new
debt, keeping constant the interest rate applied to existing debt. In this way, I reconcile the structure
of the model with the fact that xed-rate contracts are long term.15
The rst-order conditions for these consumers are as follows:
CcvAt
CcvBt
=
nPBt
(1  n)PAt (21)
n
CcvAt
= eEt nRAt
At+1CcvAt+1

+ cvAtRAt; (22)
wcvt = (L
cv
t )
 1 CcvAt
n
; (23)
jt
Hcvt
=
n
CcvAt
qt   eEt n
CcvAt+1
qt+1   cvt kAEtqt+1At+1: (24)
These rst-order conditions di¤er from those of unconstrained individuals. In the case of constrained
consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint (cvt ) appears in equations (22) and
(24). As in Iacoviello (2005), the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained individuals
borrow the maximum amount they are allowed, and their saving is zero.16
The problem for consumers is analogous in Country B.
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final-Goods Producers
In Country A, there is a continuum of nal-goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according
to the production function:
15Another option would be to have an overlapping generation model in which we are able to keep track of the debt issued
each period. However, the model would become more complex and less comparable with the standard collateral constraint
DSGE models, such as that of Iacoviello (2005).
16From the Euler equations for consumption of the unconstrained consumers, we know that RA = 1= , where variables
without a time subscript denote steady-state variables. If we combine this result with the Euler equation for consumption
for the constrained individual, we have cv = n

   e =CcvA > 0. Given that  > e, the borrowing constraint holds with
equality in steady state. Since the model is log-linearized around the steady state and low uncertainty is assumed, this
result can be generalized to o¤-steady-state dynamics.
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Y k1t =
Z 1
0
Y k1t (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (25)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
The total demand of intermediate-good z is given by YAt (z) =

PAt(z)
PAt
 "
YAt; and the price index
is PAt =
hR 1
0 PAt (z)
1 " dz
i 1
" 1
:
2.2.2 Intermediate-Goods Producers
The intermediate-goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005), intermedi-
ate goods are produced according to the following production function:
YAt (z) = t (L
u
t (z))
A (Lct (z))
(1 A) ; (26)
where t represents technology. I assume that log t =  log t 1 + ut, where  is the autoregressive
coe¢ cient and ut is a normally distributed shock to technology. A 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size
of each group in terms of labor. Lct is labor supplied by constrained consumers, dened as AL
cv
t +
(1  A)Lcft .
The rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following:17
wut =
t
Xt
A
YAt
Lut
; (27)
wcvt = w
cf
t =
t
Xt
(1  A) YAt
Lct
; (28)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.
The price-setting problem for the intermediate-goods producers is a standard Calvo-Yun case. An
intermediate-goods producer sells goods at price PAt (z) ; and 1    is the probability of being able to
change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price POPTAt (z) solves the following:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

POPTAt (z)
PAt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y OPTAt+k (z)

= 0: (29)
The aggregate price level is given as follows:
17Symmetry across rms allows avoiding index z:
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PAt =
h
P "At 1 + (1  )
 
POPTAt
1 "i1=(1 ")
: (30)
Using (29) and (30) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard forward-looking Phillips curve
(see equation (74) in the Appendix).18
The rm problem is similar in Country B.
2.3 Aggregate Variables and Market Clearing
Given A; the fraction of variable-rate borrowers in Country A, we can dene aggregates across con-
strained consumers as the sum of variable-rate and xed-rate aggregates, so that Cct  ACcvt +
(1  A)Ccft ; Hct  AHcvt + (1  A)Hcft and bct  Abcvt + (1  A) bcft :
Therefore, economy-wide aggregates in Country A are Ct  Cut + Cct , Lt  Lut + Lct . The aggregate
supply of housing is xed, so that market clearing requires Ht  Hut +Hct = H.19
The market clearing condition for the nal good in Country A is nYAt = nCAt + (1  n)CAt +
n 2 d
2
t . Domestic nancial markets clear: b
c
t = b
u
t : The world bond market clearing condition is ndt +
(1  n) PBtPAt dt = 0; where dt denotes the foreign bonds in real terms. The net foreign asset position
follows dt =
Rt 1
(1  dt)Atdt 1 + YAt   CAt  
PBt
PAt
CBt. Everything is similar in Country B.
2.4 Monetary Policy
The model closes with a Taylor rule, with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single
central bank,20
Rt = (Rt 1)
0@h(At)n (Bt)(1 n)i(1+) "YAt=YAt 1
YA
nYBt=YBt 1
YB
1 n#y
R
1A1  "R;t; (31)
0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia. (1 + ) measures the sensitivity of
interest rates to current ination. R;t is a white noise shock process with zero mean and variance 2 .
18This Phillips curve is consistent with other two-country models with nancial accelerator. See for instance Gilchrist et
al (2002) or Iacoviello and Smets (2006).
19An endogenous supply of housing could be easily introduced in a two-sector version of this model. However, the
qualitative results would not change for the demand side of the model which is the focus of this paper. For two-sector
models, see, for example, Iacoviello and Smets (2006) or Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
20This rule is consistent with the primary objective of the ECB being price stability. This type of rule is also used in
other monetary-union models. See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) or Aspachs and Rabanal (2008).
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3 Dynamics
3.1 Evidence
The e¤ects of monetary policy and other shocks on the main variables in the economy are potentially
di¤erent, depending on the housing-market characteristics in each country.21 For example, the loan-to-
value ratio is a crucial parameter because it implies the degree of credit accessibility for borrowers and
therefore the strength of the nancial accelerator. When LTVs are high, shocks that a¤ect the value of
the collateral are amplied owing to the nancial accelerator e¤ect. The prevalent mortgage structure is
also relevant for the transmission of shocks. For those consumers with variable-rate mortgages, after a
positive interest-rate shock, interest-rate payments increase by more than for the xed-rate case. Also,
the value of their collateral decreases by more.
Several empirical studies analyze the e¤ects of cross-country housing-market di¤erences on the re-
sponses of the economy to shocks. Calza et al (2009) conducted a VAR-based analysis of the e¤ects
of monetary-policy shocks on other variables. They classied countries according to their degree of
development of mortgage markets and, depending on their mortgage structure, xed- or variable-rate
mortgages. They showed that the size of the peak e¤ect of a monetary-policy shock on house prices is
positively related both to the exibility in mortgage markets and the variability of the mortgage rate.
They found consumption to be more responsive when the mortgage rate was variable, but di¤erences
were not so great for the LTV ratio. Carstensen et al (2009) also implemented a VAR study to analyze
the cross-country di¤erences in the response of house prices and other variables to a monetary-policy
shock. They likewise found that the house-price response of a monetary-policy shock was correlated with
the exibility of mortgage markets and that countries that exhibited a strong response in house prices
also showed a strong reaction in output, consumption, and ination. Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach
(2010) estimated a VAR on a panel data set, including consumer prices, real GDP, residential property
prices, short-term interest rates, and credit, for a sample of 18 OECD economies. They showed that real
GDP and residential-property prices decline more in response to a monetary-policy shock in economies
with exible mortgage markets, although the di¤erences were not so great when they grouped the coun-
tries according to their LTVs. When they divided the countries according to their mortgage structure,
they found that the e¤ects of monetary policy on GDP were faster when variable-rate mortgages were
21Erceg and Levin (2006), Barsky et al (2007), Monacelli (2009) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010) nd that in a model
with a construction sector, the housing sector is more sensitive to monetary-policy shocks. In this paper, I consider only
the nondurable sector.
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prevalent.
In this section, I present the dynamics of the model. By using a plausible calibration, I show that
the model delivers impulse responses that are in line with the empirical evidence; therefore, it is suitable
for policy and welfare analysis. In particular, to make the results comparable with those of empirical
studies, I conducted the following experiments. First, I divided the euro area into two blocks, one with
little mortgage debt and the other with high mortgage debt, and showed how these two markets responded
to common shocks. The hot housing block is composed of countries with high LTVs (greater than 75%),
which proxy for high accumulation debt; in the cold block, countries have low LTVs. Second, I divided
the area into one group, in which agents borrow at a variable mortgage interest rate, and another, in
which they do so at a xed rate. Parameters were chosen so that they realistically reected euro-area
data. Impulse responses of consumption and house prices to interest rate, technology, and house-price
shocks are displayed for all subgroups.
3.2 Parameter Values
The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in steady state.
The discount factor for borrowers, e, is set to 0:98.22 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility
function, j, is set to 0:1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be approximately 1.40 in
the steady state.23 I set  = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1:24 For the loan-to-
value ratio, I considered the weighted average for the cold housing block to be 0.62. For the hot housing
block, it was 0.79, while the total average was 0.68. The labor-income share of unconstrained consumers,
A = B, was set to 0:7.25 I picked a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution among intermediate
goods. This value implies a steady-state markup of 1:2. The probability of not changing prices, , is set
to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters on average. For the Taylor Rule parameters,
I used  = 0:8,  = 0:5: The rst value reects a realistic degree of interest-rate smoothing.26  is
consistent with the original parameters proposed by Taylor in 1993. For the baseline model, I considered
22Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0:95 and 0:98 at quarterly frequency.
23This value corresponds to the US. I assume here that the ratio is similar across most industrialized countries, given the
lack of housing wealth data for European countries. See Aspachs and Rabanal (2008).
24Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) showed
that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimate could have a downward bias of 50%.
25This value is in the range of the estimates of Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the US, and Campbell
and Mankiw (1991) for the US, Canada, France, and Sweden. Table 4 in the Appendix shows robustness checks for welfare
considering di¤erent values of this parameter.
26See McCallum (2001).
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A = B = 1, that is, all mortgages are variable rate.27 However, I also considered the case of xed-rate
mortgages. Country sizes were set depending on GDP weights on the countries included.28
Monetary-policy shocks were represented by a 0.29% increase in the interest rate on a quarterly basis
(as in Iacoviello 2005). A technology shock was a 1% positive technology with 0.9 persistence.29 House
price shocks had a 0.95 persistence.30 I set the size of the shock to the housing-demand parameter at
24.89%, consistent with Iacoviello (2005). Table 2 in the Appendix presents a summary of the parameter
values.
3.3 Hot and cold housing markets
In this subsection, I divided the euro area into two blocks, one with high debt accumulation and the
other one with low debt. As a proxy of the rst type, I considered those countries from the union that
have high LTVs, and I weighted the block by the countriesappropriate size in terms of their GDP. The
remainder constituted the cold housing block.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 shows the e¤ects of a monetary-policy shock, a technology shock, and a house-price shock
in a monetary union on consumption and house prices for both the hot and the cold blocks. The solid
line represents the hot block, that is, those countries with higher LTVs. The dotted line represents the
cold block.
For monetary-policy shocks, the reasoning is as follows: an increase in the interest rate contracts
the economy. Savers substitute intertemporally and prefer to save today to consume tomorrow. For
borrowers, there is both a direct and an indirect e¤ect in making their consumption decrease. First,
their mortgage payments increase, and therefore they consume less. The second e¤ect comes through the
collateral constraint. Since housing prices decrease following the interest-rate increase, the value of their
collateral decreases. Impatient agents are able to borrow less and hence consume less. This collateral
e¤ect, however, is stronger the higher the LTV parameter. We can see that the e¤ects of this shock on
consumption are amplied in the hot block, which means that the nancial accelerator is stronger there.
The e¤ects for house prices are very similar, though.
27This value makes the model comparable with the standard models, where xed-rate mortgages are not considered.
28The sizes of the hot housing block and variable-rate group of countries were 0.37 and 0.35, respectively.
29This high persistence value for technology shocks is consistent with what is commonly reported in the literature. Smets
and Wouters (2002) estimated a value of 0.822 for this parameter in Europe; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimated it as 0.93
for the US.
30The persistence of the house price shock is consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
16
The experiment for a common-technology and house-price shock is analogous. Also in this case total
consumption would react more in a country that has a high LTV ratio. After a technology shock, the
interest rate would decrease and housing prices in both countries increase. The collateral e¤ect is greater
in the hot block, with the higher LTV, and therefore its consumption would increase by more. The same
applies to the house-price shocks. With increasing house prices, the value of the collateral goes up more
in the hot block and thus consumption increases by more.
The model behaved similarly to the empirical studies mentioned above, where for monetary-policy
shocks, the e¤ects are moderately stronger in economies with higher LTV ratios. Just like Calza et al
(2009) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010), I found that the peak e¤ect on house prices of
monetary-policy shocks was stronger for the hot block. The peak di¤erences between the two blocks was
also comparable to this studies around 0.001, as in Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010), while it is
0.002 in Calza et al (2009). Also, in line with the empirical studies I mentioned, I found that the respon-
siveness of consumption to the same shock was larger for the hot block, although the di¤erences were
not very great when grouping the countries by LTVs, about a magnitude of 0.0001 (as in Assenmacher-
Wesche and Gerlach (2010), slightly larger in Calza et al (2009)) . Here, the open-economy e¤ects were
present. In a closed-economy experiment, countries are unable to smooth consumption by trading both
goods and nancial assets with the other country. Here, the country that is hit more strongly by the
shock can still borrow from the other country to soften the di¤erences. I found that for house-price
shocks, di¤erences for consumption between both blocks were amplied.
3.4 Fixed-versus variable-mortgage rates
Another source of heterogeneity in housing markets is the mortgage structure. I divided the euro area
into two groups of countries; ones that mainly borrow at a variable rate and others that do so at a xed
rate. In Figure 2, I present the responses of consumption and house prices to an interest-rate shock, a
technology shock, and a house-price shock when countries are divided according to their interest-rate
variability. The solid line represents those countries with variable-rate mortgages while the dotted line
corresponds to the xed-rate block. Given the same shock, consumption reacted more strongly for the
group of countries with variable rates, especially for the technology and house-price shocks. When rates
in the economy are variable, the shock pass-through should be faster than when they are xed. Variable
rates are tied to the policy rate, set by the central bank, while xed rates are linked to longer-term rates.
Then, mortgage payments increase by more in the variable-rate country, producing an extra decrease in
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consumption. Also, housing demand decreases by more for the variable-rate country and therefore the
collateral e¤ects are stronger.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
These results are also in line with the VAR studies, which show that monetary-policy responses are
greater for countries with variable rates. As in the case of the hot and cold block, I found that di¤erences
are not so great for monetary-policy shocks, they were in fact almost negligible as compared with the
empirical studies which showed di¤erences ranging from 0.001-0.005 for consumption and 0.003-0.005 for
house prices. The open-economy and general equilibrium e¤ects were also present here, and variable-
rate countries were able to smooth consumption by trading with the other block. For the technology
shock, I found that initially consumption reacted less for variable rates, but that the e¤ects were more
persistent. House prices increased more in the variable-rate case, which is what occurs in empirical
models. With regard to the house-price shock, the impact response of consumption was stronger when
rates were variable.
4 Welfare Analysis
We have seen that the transmission of shocks in a monetary union when there is housing-market het-
erogeneity across countries and that the model delivers impulse responses, which are in line with the
empirical literature. However, a remaining question is whether these countries should homogenize their
structures or not. Maclennan et al (1998) argued that countries in a monetary union should make an
e¤ort toward institutional homogenization in their housing markets. In this section, I use welfare analy-
sis to study whether this is always the case. Since the model previously presented plausible results, I
was able to use it to evaluate welfare. In particular, I studied whether countries converging in their
degree of credit accessibility and type of mortgage contracts would be benecial. Here, I focus on these
two aspects because, although I consider them exogenous, they are the ones that are most related to
institutional features of the economy. Changes in regulation or recommendations of the central bank
could make these parameters change.
To address these questions, I numerically evaluated how cross-country asymmetries a¤ect welfare for
a given policy rule and for common-technology shocks. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008),
the two approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either
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characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to
the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino
and Pescatori (2007), I take this latter approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the three types of
agents separately.31 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers in Country A is dened, respectively,
as follows:
Vu;t  Et
1X
m=0
m
 
lnCut+m + jt lnH
u
t+m  
 
Lut+m


!
; (32)
Vcv;t  Et
1X
m=0
em lnCcvt+m + jt lnHcvt+m    Lcvt+m
!
; (33)
Vcf;t  Et
1X
m=0
em
0@lnCcft+m + jt lnHcft+m  

Lcft+m


1A : (34)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I dene social welfare in Country A as a weighted sum of
the individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Vt = (1  )Vu;t +

1  e [AVcv;t + (1  A)Vcf;t] : (35)
Borrowers and saverswelfare are weighted by

1  e and (1  ) ; respectively, so that the two groups
receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. Everything is symmetrical for
Country B.
Total welfare is dened as a weighted sum of the welfare in the two countries:
Wt = nVt + (1  n)V t : (36)
I performed two experiments and evaluated the results in terms of welfare. First, I considered how
welfare would change if the cold block were to become hot. Second, I reported changes in welfare
if variable-rate countries moved to a xed rate. Welfare changes were presented in terms of units of
consumption equivalents. As in Ascari and Ropele (2009), I found the constant fraction of steady-state
31 I used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order
approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous
consumers.
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consumption that would have to be transferred to the agent if there were a welfare loss under the new
parameterization.32 Then, a negative value of consumption units represented a welfare increase, that
is, how much the agent would pay in units of consumption in order to be better o¤. A positive value
means that welfare was decreasing, that is, by how much an agent should be compensated in units
of consumption. Table 3 displays the results. The rst column shows how welfare (in consumption
equivalent units) would change if the cold block increased its LTV from 0.62 to 0.79. We see that the
cold block would be worse o¤ by increasing its LTV. There is, however, a trade-o¤ between the welfare
of borrowers and savers. The welfare of the borrowers decreases when the loan-to-value ratio increases.
Conversely, saverswelfare increases. This result is in line with that of Campbell and Hercowitz (2009),
who performed a welfare analysis in a DSGE model with borrowers and savers and determined that
although high LTV ratios have a direct positive e¤ect on welfare through constraint relaxation, other
indirect e¤ects may dominate. Notice that k, the LTV ratio, is a parameter that strongly a¤ects the
collateral constraint. A small change in this parameter can cause very large changes in borrowing that
can be excessive. Higher LTVs lead to higher consumption levels, because borrowing constraints are
always binding: the more borrowers are o¤ered, the more they take. But this in turn, as shown in
Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), changes relative prices. In particular, higher consumption levels imply
higher interest rates. This could lead to a situation of overindebtedness in the sense that high repayments
could o¤set the positive e¤ects on constraint relaxation. Smith (2009) shows that these results do not
rely on the specic assumptions of Campbell and Hercowitz (2009); even in the simplest model with
borrowers, savers, and collateral constraints, this e¤ect takes place.33 For aggregate welfare, it is also
the case that welfare decreases with higher LTVs. Figure 3 complements these results and shows how
welfare would change if the cold block modied its LTV (k) for a continuous range of this parameter.
The dot represents the initial baseline case. The dotted and solid lines correspond to the cold and hot
blocks, respectively. We see that when the cold block moves from the initial case to a higher LTV, its
welfare decreases and therefore, the consumption units needed for compensation increase; since countries
share nancial and trade links, the hot block can benet slightly from this welfare loss. This graph shows
that heterogeneity in LTVs is not necessarily welfare worsening. I found that homogenization does not
deliver the best outcome if both countries have a high value of k; because there is too much wealth,
32The consumption equivalent measure for the saver, as in Ascari and Ropele (2009) is given by 1  exp[(1 )(Vu;new  
Vu;old], and analogously for the other agents.
33Huggett (1997) also found a similar result, but in this case is the reduction in the precautionary motive for saving,
driven by the looser borrowing constraints, what leads to the increase in the interest rate.
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which is redistributed from borrowers to savers.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The second column of Table 3 shows the welfare change if the variable-rate countries became xed
rate. We can observe that in the variable block, although total welfare increases by moving to xed-rate
mortgages, this is at the expense of savers, who are worse o¤. Borrowers prefer xed-rate contracts
as opposed to savers, who prefer variable rates. Even though under xed-interest rates the monetary
authority is losing a policy tool, this type of contract reduces one of the distortions of the economy,
and this enhances welfare for borrowers. Equation (62), the log-linearized collateral constraint in the
Appendix, shows how debt repayments in real terms decrease with the value of ; and this relaxes the
constraint. The di¤erence with the previous case is that reducing  does not have such a strong impact
on borrowing as increasing k. It helps borrowers to lower debt repayments in real terms but without
causing overindebtedness (notice that the steady-state value of borrowing does not depend on ; but
does depend on k). However, although xed rates make the collateral constraint less tight for borrowers,
savers have to bear all the risk associated with interest-rate variability. For this parameterization,
the welfare improvement for borrowers compensates this risk and also aggregate welfare increases with
xed-rate mortgages. Figure 4 shows the evolution of welfare when variable-rate countries move from
the baseline to a higher proportion of xed-rate mortgages.  = 0 corresponds to xed-rate mortgages.
Higher values of  imply a higher proportion of variable-rate mortgages. The baseline case corresponds
to the dot. The dotted and solid lines denote the variable- and xed-rate countries, respectively. When
variable-rate countries move towards xed-rate mortgages, their welfare increases (consumption units
become more and more negative, meaning that they would be willing to pay in terms of consumption
in order to achieve this outcome). In this case, homogenization toward xed-rate mortgages is welfare
improving because aggregate volatility is reduced.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper explores how cross-country housing-market heterogeneity a¤ects the transmission of shocks
and welfare in a monetary union. Since there is clear evidence of such heterogeneity across countries
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in Europe, it is relevant to evaluate to what extent this is important. Some normative conclusions are
presented as to whether housing-market homogenization is desirable.
For this purpose, I built a two-country DSGE model that featured a housing market. A group of
individuals in each country were credit constrained and needed housing collateral to obtain loans. I
considered the countries part of a monetary union. I allowed for countries to be heterogeneous in their
LTVs and their mortgage contracts, and I found that in line with empirical VAR studies, shocks were
transmitted more strongly, in general, if the country had a high LTV or mainly variable-rate mortgages.
The recommendation that European countries should move toward institutional homogenization, par-
ticularly with respect to housing markets, is often heard. I performed welfare analysis to explore under
which conditions this was the case. From a normative perspective, I found that housing-market homoge-
nization per se is not necessarily benecial, only when homogenization did not result in higher aggregate
volatility or did not redistribute too much wealth from borrowers to savers. In line with the results
of recent studies, homogenization toward high LTVs decreased welfare; indirect e¤ects dominated the
direct e¤ect of relaxing the borrowing constraints. As for mortgage contracts, the results suggested that
countries with predominantly variable-rate contracts should move toward xed-rate contracts because
they reduce the distorting e¤ects of the collateral constraint without causing excessive borrowing.
This paper could serve as a basis for numerous extensions. One of the features of the kind of models
used here is that borrowing constraints are always binding and the same agents are always constrained.
An overlapping-generations version of the model could deal with this issue, and it would also allow
mortgage contracts to be modeled in a more realistic way.34 The introduction of an additional sector,
which produces houses or a rental market, would also permit the study of other relevant topics that were
not the focus of the present paper. For future research, it would be interesting to determine the optimal
monetary policy under di¤erent sources of asymmetry or take a step towards estimation.
34See Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2012) that proposed to solve methods of this kind using a shooting algorithm.
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Appendix
Steady-state relationships
Relative prices in the steady state are derived from equations (10), (21) and their counterparts for
Country B:
n
1  n
PB
PA
=
CuA
CuB
=
CcA
CcB
=
CuA
CuB
=
CcA
CcB
(37)
Interest rates:
RA = R = RB = R = R

= 1= (38)
We can nd the consumption-to-housing ratio for savers and borrowers in Country A by using the
rst-order conditions for housing:
CuA
qHu
=
n
j
(1  ) (39)
CcA
qHc
=
n
j
h
1  e  kA    ei = n
j
 (40)
Similarly, for Country B:
CuB
qHu
=
(1  n)
j
(1  ) (41)
CcB
qHc
=
(1  n)
j
h
1  e  kB    ei = (1  n)
j
 (42)
Borrowing in the steady state is as follows:
bc = kAqH
c: (43)
bu + bc = 0
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bc = kBqHc: (44)
bu + bc = 0
From the rm problem, we have that in the steady state:
wu =
1
X

YA
Lu
; (45)
wc =
1
X
(1  ) YA
Lc
; (46)
wu =
1
X

YB
Lu
; (47)
wc =
1
X
(1  ) YB
Lc
; (48)
where X = X =
"  1
"
:
Combining the steady-state budget constraint for unconstrained consumers in Country A with (39)
and (45) we obtain:
CuA
YA
=
n ( +X   1)
X (1  jkA) (49)
Similarly, for constrained consumers:
CcA
YA
=
1  
X
n
 + jkA (1  ) (50)
The market-clearing conditions for goods produced in Country A imply:
CA
YA
=
n
1  n

1  C
u
A
YA
  C
c
A
YA

Using (39) and (49) we can nd the housing-to-output ratio for savers in Country A:
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Hu
YA
=
j ( +X   1)
Xq (1  jkA) (1  ) (51)
Analogously, using (40) and (50) we can nd the housing-to-output ratio for constrained consumers
in Country A:
Hc
YA
=
(1  ) j
Xq
n
 + jkA (1  ) (52)
Similarly, for Country B:
CuB
YB
=
(1  n) ( +X   1)
X (1  jkB) (53)
CcB
YB
=
1  
X
 (1  n)
 + jkB (1  ) (54)
Hu
YB
=
j ( +X   1)
Xq (1  jkB) (1  ) (55)
Hc
YB
=
(1  ) j
Xq
(1  n)
 + jkB (1  ) (56)
Log-linearized equations
Variables in deviations from the steady state are expressed in lower-case and with a hat.
Interest rates
r^At = r^Bt + Et (e^t+1   e^t) +  ; (57)
brAt = brBt = 0: (58)
Aggregate demand
bcuAt = EtbcuAt+1   (brAt   EtbAt+1) ; (59)
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bcuBt = EtbcuBt+1   (brBt   EtbBt+1) ; (60)
c^cAt =

 + jkA (1  )


y^At + bt   x^t  j


h^ct   h^ct 1

+
kAj


b^ct   b^ct 1

  kAj (Ar^At 1   ^At) ; (61)
b^ct = Etq^t+1 + h^
c
t   (Ar^At   Et^At+1) ; (62)
c^cBt =

 + jkB (1  )


y^Bt + bt   x^t  j h^ct   h^ct 1
+
kBj



b^ct   b^ct 1

  kBj (B r^Bt 1   ^Bt) ; (63)
b^ct = Etq^

t+1 + h^
c
t   (B r^Bt   Et^Bt+1) ; (64)
c^At   c^Bt = c^At   c^Bt (65)
Housing equations
bhut = 11   (bcuAt   bqt)  1  Et  bcuAt+1   bqt+1 ; (66)
bhut = 11   (bcuBt   bqt )  1  Et  bcuBt+1   bqt+1 ; (67)
h^ct =
1  kA

c^ct  
1

q^t   kA

(Ar^At   Et^At+1) +
e

Etq^t+1  
e (1  kA)

Etc^
c
t+1: (68)
h^ct =
1  kB

c^ct  
1

q^t  
kB

(B r^Bt   Et^Bt+1) +
e

Etq^

t+1  
e (1  kB)

Etc^
c
t+1: (69)
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Aggregate supply
y^At =
 + 1
   1
bt   1
   1 (c^
u
At + (1  ) c^cAt + x^t) ; (70)
y^At =

CuA
YA
+
CcA
YA

c^At +

1  C
u
A
YA
  C
c
A
YA

c^At (71)
y^Bt =
 + 1
   1
bt   1   1 (c^uBt + (1  ) c^cBt + x^t ) ; (72)
y^Bt =

CuB
YB
+
CcB
YB

c^Bt +

1  C
u
B
YB
  C
c
B
YB

c^Bt; (73)
^At = ^At+1   ekx^t + uAt; (74)
^Bt = ^

Bt+1   ekx^t + uBt; (75)
where ek = (1 )(1 ) and uAt and uBt are cost-push shocks.
Monetary policy
r^At = Ar^At 1+ (1  A) [(1 + A) ^At + Ayy^At] + bAR;t; (76)
r^Bt = B r^Bt 1+ (1  B) [(1 + B) ^Bt + Byy^Bt] + bBR;t; (77)
Note that under the monetary union regime (76) and (77) become:
r^t = r^t 1+ (1  ) f(1 + ) [n^At + (1  n) ^Bt] + y [nAty^At + (1  n) y^Bt]g+ bR;t (78)
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Figure Legends
Figure 1: Impulse responses: hot versus cold blocks
Figure 2: Impulse responses: variable- versus xed-rate countries
Figure 3: Cold countries become hot. Consumption equivalents
Figure 4: Variable-rate countries become xed-rate. Consumption equivalents
Tables
Country LTV Debt/GDP Rate
BELGIUM 83 43,3 F
FINLAND 75 58 V
FRANCE 75 38 F
GERMANY 70 47,6 F
ITALY 50 21,7 V
IRELAND 70 90,3 F
NETHERLANDS 90 105,6 F
PORTUGAL 75 67,5 V
SPAIN 70 66,4 V
Table 1: Characteristics of mortgage markets. Source: IMF (2008)
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Parameter Values
 :99 Discount Factor for Saverse :98 Discount Factor for Borrowers
j :1 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
k 0:68 Average loan-to-value ratio
 :70 Labor-Income share for borrowers
 1 Degree of variability of interest rate
" 6 Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
 0:8 Interest-rate smoothing in Taylor rule
 :5 Ination Parameter in Taylor rule
 0:29 Monetary shock standard error
j 24:85 House price shock standard error
 0:9 Technology shock persistence
j 0:95 House price shock persistence
Table 2: Parameter Values
Cold become Hot Variable become Fixed
Consumption Units Consumption Units
Cold Block 0.006 Variable Block -0.70
Savers -0.01 Savers 0.84
Borrowers 0.29 Borrowers -35.5
Hot Block -0.0004 Fixed Block 0.008
Savers -0.15 Savers -0.07
Borrowers 0.05 Borrowers 0.42
Union 0.003 Union -0.25
Table 3: Consumption equivalent measure of welfare when cold countries become hot and variable-rate
become xed-rate (Results represent the constant fraction of steady-state consumption that would have
to be transferred to the agent if there were a welfare loss)
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Cold become Hot Variable become Fixed
Consumption Units Consumption Units
 = 0:6  = 0:7  = 0:8  = 0:6  = 0:7  = 0:8
Cold Block 0.006 0.006 0.005 Variable Block -0.23 -0.70 -2.39
Hot Block -0.001 -0.0004 -0.00008 Fixed Block 0.007 0.008 0.004
Table 4 : Robustness analysis for di¤erent values of  (Results represent the constant fraction of
steady-state consumption that would have to be transferred to the agent if there were a welfare loss)
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